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China’s Energy Diplomacy and Its “Peaceful 
Rise” Ambition: The Cases of Sudan and Iran
Janet Xuanli Liao
China has underscored its intention for peaceful development with the vision for a 
“harmonious world.” But at the same time China is keen to play a more proactive 
role in the international rule-making process, addressing its dissatisfaction with 
the existing international system. This article examines whether China’s energy 
diplomacy vis-à-vis Sudan and Iran has helped or hindered its ambition for peaceful 
development. China’s dealings with Sudan have departed from its long-standing 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs to one of active intervention, a 
change intended to help build China’s image as a “responsible power.” China has 
also demonstrated its ambition and determination to play a more assertive role 
in dealing with Iran’s nuclear crisis to facilitate safeguarding China’s energy and 
economic interests. Yet Beijing has been willing to sacrifice its energy interests when 
necessary in order to be perceived as a responsible stakeholder within the current 
international establishment. While it might be natural for China to aspire to a more 
active international role that befits its economic status, China’s objective of building 
a harmonious world and its peaceful rise ambition will remain unattainable dreams 
unless Beijing is prepared to accept some universal principles to guide its energy 
diplomacy.
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Introduction
Chinese diplomacy has undergone enormous change since the onset of the 
open door era in the late 1970s. Moving away from Maoist ideology-based 
revolutionary diplomacy, China has since embarked on a more pragmatic 
economic diplomacy. This has enabled China to benefit from an international 
environment that is more favourable for its economic development. With the 
unprecedented economic growth achieved over the past couple of decades, 
China became the world’s largest exporter in 2009, at the same time surpassing 
Germany to become the third largest economy in the world. In 2010, China 
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overtook Japan to take the second spot, immediately leading to predictions 
that China would surpass the United States by 2020 to become the world’s top 
economic power (Mufson 2010). China’s growing potential has made rising 
China a persistent issue of debate, particularly since the mid-1990s, focusing on 
whether China’s rise poses a threat to the current international system. Since the 
turn of the 21st century, the debate has been linked to China’s energy diplomacy, 
and questions are being asked not only about whether China can rise peacefully, 
but also whether it can be a responsible stakeholder on the international stage.
China’s search for overseas energy resources started in the 1990s, soon after 
it became a net oil importer in 1993. Initially, China’s energy diplomacy was 
focused on the nearby belt regions, consisting of Russia and Central Asia, as well 
as on the Middle East and North Africa. By the time China became the world’s 
second largest oil importer in 2009 its energy diplomacy had become global. With 
Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) operating in more than 50 countries 
around the world—including in the so-called rogue states of Sudan and Iran—
China’s energy diplomacy soon triggered considerable concern and criticism 
from the outside world. One of the main concerns raised was whether China 
could keep the right balance between its energy security interests and the need to 
be a responsible stakeholder. In other words, the key issue was whether China’s 
energy diplomacy would facilitate or hinder its strategy of peaceful rise. Raising 
this question by no means suggests that China’s search for overseas energy might 
be pursued by military means, or that it would potentially trigger armed conflicts. 
Rather, by examining China’s dealings with the states of concern in its search for 
energy, I hope to reveal the fundamental principles that underpin China’s energy 
diplomacy and to conclude whether or not China aims at challenging the existing 
international order and forcing its way as an emerging power, as argued by many 
scholars of international relations.    
This article intends to answer this question by investigating China’s energy 
diplomacy towards different regions and the implications for China’s peaceful 
rise aspiration. It argues that China is not a revisionist power that aims to 
challenge the current international system, but is happy to conform to established 
international standards. However, China is not completely satisfied with the 
established rules and, therefore, is also keen to play a greater role in the rule-
making process. The controversies triggered by China’s energy diplomacy are 
partially due to the pragmatism of such diplomacy based on the non-interference 
principle. But more than that, they also indicate uneasiness with China’s ambition 
to build a “harmonious world” (hexie shijie), which implies a more assertive role 
by China in international affairs under a multi-value system. The analysis below 
has four parts. Section two reviews the endless theoretical debates over China’s 
rise and the scholarly interpretation of Hu Jintao’s harmonious world proposition. 
The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical framework for the case 
studies presented in section three, and also to help present the new thinking in 
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China’s foreign policy principles. In section three, the two case studies focus on 
China’s energy diplomacy vis-à-vis Sudan and Iran and describe the evolution 
and major features of China’s energy diplomacy concerning the two nations. The 
final section is the conclusion that highlights the findings from the case studies 
and evaluates the likely implications of China’s energy diplomacy for its peaceful 
rise approach.
China’s Rise and the Theoretical Debates 
Despite its long history as the Middle Kingdom, China enjoyed little recognition 
or significance in the modern international system until the late 1970s. Indeed, 
after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China 
faced international isolation for more than two decades and only began to 
reintegrate itself with the international system in 1972, marked by its return to the 
United Nations (UN). But prior to its open-door era beginning in 1978, Beijing 
viewed itself as an outsider of the international system and developed the well-
known Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (FPPC) (heping gongchu wuxiang 
yuanze)1 as the basis for its foreign policy. 
At the peak of Maoist revolutionary diplomacy, China publicly asserted that 
it would not work with the biased and unjustified international system, expressing 
its desire to replace it with a new revolutionary world system (Zhao 2006). Mao’s 
diplomacy made little impact on the outside world, but concerns over the likely 
implications of China’s policy for the world system seem to have never been 
forgotten. As early as the 1970s, for instance, the former U.S. Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger (1973-77) already warned: “Once China becomes strong enough 
to stand alone, it might discard us. A little later it might even turn against us, if its 
perception of its interests requires it” (Kissinger 1979, 1091). 
In September 1989, after the East European transitions, Deng Xiaoping 
invoked the famous taoguang yanghui principle (often translated “hide one’s 
brightness and nourish one’s capability”) with the implication that China could 
indeed be a potential threat. But taken into context with Deng’s other statements, 
such as “We should never seek leadership and this should be our basic policy,” 
and “We should concentrate on just one thing: to get our own business done 
well” (Deng 1993, 321, 363), a more appropriate translation of the term taoguang 
yanghui should instead be “not to show off one’s strength, rather focus on self-
improvement.” Deng’s thinking can be viewed as a transition from the FPPC 
position to a focus on China’s peaceful rise, which stresses the non-interference 
principle in the process of China’s development. 
However, China was not the only rising power that faced suspicion and 
scrutiny from the status quo powers in the post-war era. For instance, Japan 
alarmed the world in the 1970s with its impressive economic growth, and more 
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recently the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have emerged 
as a new power group on the world stage. Yet none of these emerging powers 
has been viewed as a threat that could challenge the established international 
system—not even post-Soviet Russia despite its reluctance to get along with the 
Western powers (Rise 2000, 57-8). Two issues seem to have distinguished China’s 
rise from its peers. One is that China’s rise is actually a re-emergence of the 
Middle Kingdom, in Joseph Nye’s words. China is not a new major power in the 
Asia-Pacific region; it was a world leader until the 16th Century (Nye 1998, 66). 
The other view is the Middle Kingdom syndrome, as held by Thomas Fingar (2012, 
200). According to Fingar, the Chinese believe that “their country is superior 
and entitled to dominate its periphery (and by extension the world), and that it 
has suffered from nearly two centuries of overweening dominance by barbarian 
imperialists. … Whether and how this may differ from other manifestations of 
big-power chauvinism is probably less important than the fact that these beliefs 
are widely accepted as true in China, and taken into consideration by other 
countries when assessing what motivates Chinese leaders to act as they do” (2012, 
200). 
Following China’s steady growth and the end of the Cold War, the China 
threat theory (Zhongguo weixie lun) re-emerged in the 1990s, represented by 
Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro’s article, China: The Coming Conflict with 
America (1997). The authors argued that China is seeking to replace the United 
States as the dominant power in Asia and this would conflict with an established 
American objective: preventing any single country from gaining overwhelming 
power in Asia. A debate over whether China will become a threat to the world 
has been going on ever since (Segal 1988; Roy 1996; Yee and Storey 2002; 
Shambaugh 2005). After the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 
May 1999, the hawkish view gained more influence in Washington, as expressed 
by Condoleezza Rice (2000, 55-6), then Foreign Policy Advisor to Republican 
presidential candidate George W. Bush: 
Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing, China is 
still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is 
currently no match for that of the United States. But that condition is not necessarily 
permanent. What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital 
interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the 
role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is not a 
“status quo” power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own 
favour.  
In the new century, and largely as a result of China’s energy diplomacy 
with rogue states, the debate evolved beyond the China threat proposition to 
questioning whether China is a revisionist power aiming to alter the existing 
international system (Foot 2001; Masud 2004; Jiang 2009). 
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The View of the Realist School 
Focusing on the dynamics of the changing power balance in international 
relations, classical realist scholars have viewed China’s growing potential as an 
unavoidable threat to the existing world order. They have employed mainly two 
sets of theories to explain likely consequences of China’s rise. One was the balance 
of power theory which contended that the probability of war was lower in a 
bipolar international system—the closer the military capability between the major 
powers, the stronger its deterrence effect. After the U.S.-USSR bipolar system 
disappeared, conflict was most likely when a rising power (China), dissatisfied 
with the status quo, sought equality with the dominant state (USA), in a region 
or system and was willing to use force to reshape the rules and institutions of that 
system (Gilpin 1981; Layne 1993; Wohlforth 1999; Mearsheimer 2001; Huang and 
Chu 2009). The other was the theory of hegemonic stability. This view held that 
in an anarchic international system “the presence of a single, strongly dominant 
actor in international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states 
in the international system.” (Snidal 1985, 579) Any attempt to maximize one’s 
power could be viewed as a revisionist threat (Waltz 2000; Johnston 2003). In 
contemporary times, as Mearsheimer (2004, 2) argues, it is almost impossible 
for any state to achieve global hegemony, hence the best outcome that a state can 
hope for is to be a regional hegemon, as the United States has done. Yet regional 
hegemons do not want peers. Therefore, the United States would not tolerate 
China to be a regional hegemon in Asia. Looking at history, Steven Mufson (2010) 
maintained that “rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war 
that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power.”
The defensive realist school addressed China’s intention, instead of 
its growing potential, arguing that China’s increasing integration with the 
international system could help prevent armed conflicts with the existing powers. 
Avery Goldstein (2001), for instance, claimed that China had followed a fairly 
conservative, cautious foreign policy that was unlikely to present a significant 
threat to international security over the near-to-medium term. According 
to Goldstein (2001, 836), in addition to the core survival concerns, “China’s 
contemporary grand strategy is designed to engineer the country’s rise to the 
status of a true great power that shapes, rather than simply responds to, the 
international system,” but the strategy “lacks any obvious ambition or reason to 
indulge a thirst for international expansion, let alone domination.” Therefore, it 
was inappropriate to compare Beijing’s diplomatic approach with some of the 
20th century’s most disruptive actors—Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany, Imperial 
Japan and the Soviet Union. Responding to the concern about how China would 
use its power if it came to equal or exceed that of the United States (Cohen 2009, 
38), Quansheng Zhao presented a model of managed great power relations (2009, 
250). According to Zhao, the United States and China are likely to be the only two 
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superpowers of the 21st century; thus they “need to find accommodating ways, 
such as mutual acknowledgement of each other’s core interests, that allow the two 
countries to coexist as ‘stakeholders’” (2009, 250). 
Employing the theory of economic interdependence, Moore and Yang (2001, 
191) claimed that due to greater economic interdependence in the world today, 
China’s rise would not pose any threat to other nations. They held that “the webs 
of interdependence spun by China’s growing participation in the world economy 
will serve as the best guard against Beijing’s becoming a source of instability in 
East Asia” (Moore and Yang 2001, 191). Their position was shared by a group of 
Chinese scholars who maintained that China was comfortable with the current 
international system and had been an active participant over the past few decades. 
By 2006, China had already joined more than 100 international organizations 
and signed nearly 300 international treaties. China’s perception and attitude 
towards multilateral diplomacy had also undergone important changes, making 
it a responsible power within the system (Deng and Wang 2005; Yan 2006; Deng 
2008; Wang and Wang 2008, Feng 2009; Buzan 2010; Qin 2010).
China’s Peaceful Rise: Harmonious World vs. Responsible Stakeholder
Joining the heated academic debate based on Western international relations 
theories, Chinese officials have offered their new thinking on China’s rise. 
However, their views have faced challenges from U.S. officials who are highly 
anxious about a stronger China. In 2005, Zheng Bijian, then Executive Vice-
Principal of the Central Party’s School, declared that China would rise peacefully 
by transcending the traditional ways for great powers to emerge saying:
The most significant strategic choice the Chinese have made was to embrace 
economic globalization rather than detach themselves from it. … China does not seek 
hegemony or predominance in world affairs. It advocates a new international political 
and economic order, one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the 
democratization of international relations (Zheng 2005, 20). 
The former Chinese President Hu Jintao also proposed a harmonious world 
vision in a speech at the UN’s 60th anniversary on September 15, 2005. In order 
to build such a world, Hu held, “all countries should join hands in coping with 
global threats” by upholding multilateralism and inclusiveness, and “encourage 
and support the efforts to peacefully settle international disputes or conflicts 
through consultations and negotiations” (Jiang 2005). Only a week later, however, 
Robert Zoellick, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, raised a question over how 
China would use its influence, and asked the U.S. government to urge China to 
become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. He specifically 
mentioned China’s energy security strategy as a central issue that could hurt 
China’s reputation and lead others to question its intentions (Zoellick 2005). He 
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continued: 
China’s involvement with troublesome states indicates at best a blindness to 
consequences and at worst something more ominous. … Uncertainties about how 
China will use its power will lead the United States—and others as well—to hedge 
relations with China. Many countries hope China will pursue a ‘Peaceful Rise’, but 
none will bet their future on it (Zoellick 2005, 1, 5).
In responding to Zoellick’s suspicion, some Chinese scholars (Li 2003; Liu 
2003; Zhou 2003; Ni 2006; Hu 2007) have insisted that China would remain 
committed to the doctrine of peaceful rise despite its potential for a much more 
assertive stance, largely due to its still low economic status in per capita terms. 
In October 2005, Beijing issued its white paper on China’s Peaceful Development 
Road, which employed the notion of peaceful development to replace peaceful 
rise. The paper held that “China persists in its pursuit of harmony and 
development internally while pursuing peace and development externally; the two 
aspects, closely linked and organically united, are an integrated whole, and will 
help to build a harmonious world of sustained peace and common prosperity” 
(State Council Information Office 2005). Since then, peaceful development has 
become the standard term used by the Chinese government and scholars when 
talking about China’s growing strength. Nevertheless, for the outside world the 
possible impact of China’s rise seems to continue to be a serious concern. 
Indeed, in line with its constantly increasing potential power, China is no 
longer satisfied with merely co-existing with other countries but is seeking a 
greater role in the process of rule-making within a multi-value world system. As 
stated by then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, during his visit to Australia in April 
2006, “China firmly defends world peace; it is a player, defender and constructor 
of the international system” (Chen 2006, 37). Chinese scholars have also begun 
to interpret Hu’s harmonious world notion as a means to promote a greater role 
for China in international affairs through peaceful means. In August 2006, a 
workshop was organized by the Banyue Tan magazine (published by the Xinhua 
News Agency and sponsored by the Propaganda Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party) at which the highlight of the discussions focused on the 
meaning and implications of the harmonious world concept. Kang Shaobang, 
from the Central Party’s School, for instance, said that the notion was built on 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, but that the meaning had gone 
beyond these principles. It was aimed to encourage communications between 
different parties and to incorporate all the parties into the rule-making process 
internationally. Wang Genhua, Director of the Policy Studies Department under 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stated that the idea of the harmonious world was 
based on Chinese tradition and value systems, which varied greatly from the 
Western concepts of democracy and freedom—although he did not illustrate 
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what the Chinese value system was all about. He believed that the notion would 
help enhance China’s soft power and allow it to play a greater role in maintaining 
world stability and development. Zheng Qirong, vice-principal of the University 
of Foreign Affairs, also claimed that the harmonious world concept indicated 
China’s positive shift in its diplomacy—from a revolutionary and observer on 
the international stage to a constructor, joint rule-maker, and stakeholder of the 
international system (Xinhua August 23, 2006). 
There can be no doubt that today’s China is better integrated with the 
international system than ever before, and its government is willing to play 
a constructive role in defending the current system as well. Nevertheless, as 
suggested by the harmonious world vision, Beijing has shown more explicitly 
that it is dissatisfied with the unipolar system and is keen to promote a multipolar 
world. Therefore, it does not seem sensible to argue that China is a revisionist 
state that aims to challenge the global establishment; nor is it accurate to claim 
that China is a status quo power that will fully obey the existing order. As will 
be discussed in the two cases below, in order to be recognized as a responsible 
stakeholder by the international community China has moved away from its 
long-standing non-interference principle in dealing with Sudan. In the meantime, 
Beijing has demonstrated its readiness for more assertive energy diplomacy in 
dealing with Iran, as a means of safeguarding its energy and political interests. 
The reason for choosing the two cases for this research is partly due to the 
controversies they have triggered, and also because the two countries are among 
China’s major oil suppliers: By 2011, oil imports from the Middle East accounted 
for 51.2% of China’s total oil imports (with 10.9% of oil supply from Iran), 
followed by Africa at 23.7%, with Sudan’s share being 5.1 % (Tian 2012, 60). 
China’s Energy Diplomacy towards Sudan
Sudan was the largest country in Africa before the separation of the South in 
July 2011, and it was among the first African countries to recognize the PRC in 
1959. China started oil exploration in Sudan in 1995, not due to Sudan’s proven 
oil reserves, which only ranked 20th in the world in 1990 (Li 2012), but because 
of close bilateral relations that had been developing since the early 1990s (Large 
2008b, 38). Prior to China’s entry in 1995, two Western oil companies—France’s 
Total and Canada’s Arakis Energy Corp. (later sold to Talisman Energy Inc.)—
had initiated activities in Sudan. However, they were later forced to withdraw as a 
result of U.S. sanctions on Sudan due to its close links with Islamic international 
terrorism at this time (Goodman 2004; US Embassy in Sudan 2012). Chevron 
also operated in Sudan following the discovery of oil in the country in 1978, but 
withdrew in 1992, due in part to the disruptions caused by the second civil war 
that started in 1983, and in part owing to U.S. sanctions triggered by Khartoum’s 
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support of the Iraqi regime during the first Gulf War. In addition, Sudan faced 
isolation from the Middle East nations because its ruling party—the National 
Islamic Front—was allegedly associated with international terrorism, including 
the attempted assassination of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in June 1995. 
It was at such a time of isolation by the West and its own neighbours that 
Khartoum turned to Beijing in 1994, asking for help in oil development. At the 
time China was also under Western sanctions following the Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989, and thus it desired to establish energy-based cooperation 
with Sudan where it faced little competition (Large 2008b). According to Chen 
Fengying of the China Contemporary International Relations Institute, as a 
newcomer to the international markets, Chinese companies needed to search 
“for oil where American [and] European companies were not present, and Sudan 
represented a viable prospect” (Goodman 2004).
Following a visit by Sudanese President Brigadier Omar al-Bashir to Beijing 
in September 1995, CNPC signed a contract to develop Block 6 in Sudan’s 
Heglig Oilfield. In order to reduce the investment risk and to enable Sudan to 
avoid placing all of its eggs in one (Chinese) basket, the Greater Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company (GNPOC) was established in 1997 as a joint venture. The 
partners were CNPC (40% stake), Petronas (Malaysian, 30%), Talisman (25%), 
and the newly created Sudan Petroleum Company (Sudapet, 5%) (Greater Nile 
Petroleum Operating Company 2007). The presidency of GNPOC has been held 
by China due to CNPC’s dominant share within the consortium. When Talisman 
decided to withdraw in 2002, it sold its 25% stake for U.S. $758m 2 to India’s Oil 
and Natural Gas Corporation (New York Times October 31, 2002). In March 1997, 
the GNPOC consortium won the right to develop Blocks 1, 2, and 4 in Heglig. In 
April 1999, a 1,506 km-long oil pipeline linking Heglig Oilfield to Port Sudan was 
built allowing Sudan to supply its crude to international markets. In August 1999, 
two decades after its oil discovery, Sudan was for the first time exporting oil (Shinn 
2007). Thanks to Chinese and other partners’ investments, by 2010 Sudan could 
also declare that it owned 6.7 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, compared with 
0.3 billion barrels in 1990 (Li 2012). 
The bilateral trade relations between China and Sudan resulted in substantial 
development in the new century. Chinese oil companies, such as CNPC 
and Sinopec, became major players in Sudan’s oil sector, both upstream and 
downstream; they also built a refinery and a tanker terminal (Goodman 2004; 
Large 2007). By 2005, Sino-Sudanese trade reached $3.9bn and China became 
Sudan’s top trading partner. However, such a relationship was quite unbalanced: 
While oil counted for 71% of Sudan’s exports to China, it counted for just 5.2% 
of China’s oil imports; and China’s exports to Sudan (mainly mechanical and 
electronic goods) were only 0.2-0.3% of China’s total export trade (Tian 2006, 
4; Large 2008b, 6-7). In 2011, oil from Sudan accounted for 5.1% of China’s oil 
imports, ranking 7th after Saudi Arabia (19.8%), Angola (12.3%), Iran (10.9%), 
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Russia (7.8%), Oman (7.2%), and Iraq (5.4%) (Tian 2012, 60).
China and the Darfur Crisis
Beijing’s dealings with Khartoum might have served its energy supply objective, 
but it soon became obvious, especially after the Darfur crisis emerged in 2003, 
that China was paying the price in terms of its political reputation. Darfur, 
meaning land of the Fur, was an area that had faced many years of ethnic tension 
over land and grazing rights between the mostly nomadic Arabs and the farmers 
from the indigenous African tribes of the Fur. In early 2003, two main rebel 
groups, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, 
began attacking government targets, accusing Khartoum of oppressing black 
Africans in favour of Arabs. The government responded with a brutal counter-
insurgency campaign. By 2010 about 2.7 million people had fled their homes, 
and the UN estimated that approximately 300,000 people had died, most from 
disease (BBC News February 23, 2010). The Darfur crisis sparked severe criticism 
from Western nations and humanitarian groups who condemned the mass killing 
of civilians by the Khartoum militias. The International Criminal Court at the 
Hague even charged Sudan’s President, Omar al-Bashir, with “three counts of 
genocide” in Darfur (He 2010, 157; International Criminal Court 2012).
The Darfur crisis was certainly rooted in the historical conflicts between 
Sudan’s northern and southern ethnic groups (i.e., the majority Arabs in the 
north and indigenous Africans in the south). China was merely one of the 
countries operating in Sudan’s oil industry, along with Japan, Malaysia, and India. 
However, probably due to its position as a dominant economic partner and a 
key international political patron, China was selected as the target of criticism in 
dealing with the Darfur crisis (Large 2008a, 3-6). For instance, a report by Peter 
Goodman at the Washington Post held that Sudan’s oil exports had increased 
the stakes and also the government’s ability to pursue the battle in Darfur (Oil 
exports in 1999 allowed Khartoum to collect $500m in revenue,of which 80% was 
spent on weapons). China was further accused of being the largest arms supplier 
to Sudan and of helping set up three weapons factories near Khartoum (Goodman 
2004). Moreover, China was believed to be able to wield influence over Khartoum 
that could have assisted in brokering a peace deal, but rather chose not to use it 
in the name of its non-interference principle. The only support China offered was 
$610,000 worth of humanitarian aid to Darfur in August 2004, following a visit to 
Khartoum by China’s special envoy Lu Guozeng. Between June 11, 2004 and July 
31, 2007, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted 20 Resolutions pertaining 
to Sudan and Darfur. Beijing voted for a majority of them, but abstained on six 
votes in order to prevent possible sanctions against Sudan (Large 2008a, 8; Biswas 
2012). 
China’s non-interference position over Darfur did not do much to help solve 
the crisis, but intensified debates about whether China would be a responsible 
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stakeholder. The reasons behind China’s policy were partly linked to its oil interest 
in Sudan. As observed by Zhu Weilie, Director of Middle East and North African 
Studies at Shanghai International Studies University, “Oil from Sudan makes 
up one-tenth of all of China’s oil imports. … If we lose this source, how can we 
find another market to replace it? China has to balance its interests” (Goodman 
2004).3 Others argued that Deng Xiaoping’s taoguang yanghui strategy could also 
be responsible since, given Sudan’s comparative insignificance in China’s foreign 
trade (bilateral trade accounted for only 0.5% of China’s total), it would not serve 
Beijing’s interest to play much of a role in Sudan’s domestic affairs (Large 2008a, 8). 
However, faced with mounting international pressure over Khartoum’s 
violation of human rights, and especially when China’s own credibility started 
to be questioned, Beijing began to adopt a firmer stance against Sudan to show 
its willingness to be a responsible stakeholder. In November 2006, the Chinese 
Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, during negotiations in Addis Ababa on 
the so-called Annan Plan, proposed a compromise deal for expanding the UN 
peacekeeping role in Darfur. Wang’s proposal was viewed by U.S. Envoy to Darfur, 
Andrew Natsios, as having played “a vital and constructive role” in negotiating 
the settlement (Large 2008a, 9). Also, during his February 2007 visit to Sudan, 
Chinese President Hu Jintao reportedly told President al-Bashir: “Darfur is a part 
of Sudan and you have to resolve this problem” (Large 2008a, 9). Furthermore, 
three months later, in May, China appointed Ambassador Liu Guijin as Special 
Envoy to Darfur. Liu held that China was keen to make great efforts, together 
with the international community, to help improve the situation. In July 2007, 
Liu again promised that efforts would be made to prevent Chinese weapons from 
reaching Darfur, saying that China would do its best to prevent the weapons 
from finding their way into the wrong hands and from doing the wrong things 
(Liu 2008; Large 2008a, 10-1). On July 31, 2007, under the presidency of China, 
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1769, leading to the establishment 
of a peacekeeping force under the hybrid UN-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID). In January 2008, Beijing also sent 140 engineers and troops to 
Darfur as its contribution to the peacekeeping force under UNAMID (Large 
2008a, 9-10; Montesquiou 2008). Compared with China’s diplomatic tradition, its 
dealings with Sudan were a significant shift from the non-interference principle. 
The only other exceptions were China’s involvement with the Six-Party Talks with 
North Korea, and the P5+1 (the five UNSC permanent members plus Germany) 
talks with Iran.
Despite the compromise over the Darfur issue, Beijing was not in full 
cooperation with the international community. One example was its disregard 
for the arrest warrant against Sudanese President al-Bashir for the atrocities in 
Darfur that was issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July 2010. 
Instead, as recently as June 2011, President al-Bashir was Beijing’s guest on a 
state visit. In responding to criticism from human rights groups, Chinese Foreign 
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Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that China was not a signatory of the ICC 
treaty and thus had every right to invite Mr Bashir. Moreover, Hong held that 
“China has reserved its opinion towards the International Criminal Court lawsuit 
against President Omar al-Bashir” (BBC News June 27, 2011). China’s former 
ambassador to Ghana, Dai Yan, further argued that it was impossible for China 
not to deal with a certain country just because the West wanted to put sanctions 
on a certain person. China’s action might have had close links to its oil and 
economic interests in Sudan, but it was also said that al-Bashir’s visit was tacitly 
condoned by Washington, who called on China to help broker peace between the 
North and the South (Moore 2011; Perlez 2012). Regardless of the truth, China’s 
shifting position over Darfur has shown its desire to be viewed as a responsible 
rising power. But when it comes to situations that do not serve its interests or fit 
with its value systems, Beijing has appeared to be prepared to assert its position 
based on its harmonious world aspiration. 
China’s Dealings with South Sudan 
In January 2005, the government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, bringing to 
an end the civil war that had lasted for more than twenty years. Under the CPA, 
the Southerners were granted greater autonomy and the right to determine their 
future by referendum, after the expiration of the CPA in 2011. That referendum 
subsequently led to South Sudan’s independence on July 9, 2011 (International 
Criminal Court 2012, 3-4). China had reservations about Sudan’s potential 
division but again remained neutral during the CPA era. In March 2005 and July 
2007, Beijing twice invited Salva Kiir, the then vice-president of Sudan and later 
the first president of South Sudan, for a visit. Despite Kiir’s official capacity in 
the Sudanese government, Beijing reassured Kiir that China’s oil investments in 
Sudan would continue even after a possible secession by South Sudan in 2011. 
In August 2007, a Chinese delegation paid an official visit to Juba (the capital 
of South Sudan since July 2011), and a new aid package followed soon after, 
including support for hydro-electric projects and infrastructure construction 
(Large 2008a, 13). 
However, China’s gesture was not appreciated by Juba which viewed Beijing 
as an ally of Khartoum. Therefore, when the dispute between the two Sudans over 
the transit fee intensified in January 2012, Juba expelled Liu Yingcai, the Chief 
Executive of the Chinese and Malaysian-owned oil company Petrodar in late 
February, for non-cooperation (BBC News February 22, 2012). The dispute was 
rooted in the fact that 70% of Sudan’s oil reserves were located in the landlocked 
South while all refining and export infrastructure remained in the North; Juba 
had to export crude via Port Sudan in the North after South Sudan became 
independent in July 2011 (see Figure 1). In their bilateral negotiations, Juba 
offered $0.74 per barrel transit fee for oil through the GNPOC pipeline and $0.66 
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per barrel for the Petrodar pipeline. Khartoum, however, demanded a fee of $36 
per barrel, covering transit, processing, marine terminal, and transportation 
(International Crisis Group 2012, 26-7).   
Unable to reach an agreement on January 28, 2012, Khartoum was reported 
as accusing the South of not paying its fees and started seizing South Sudan’s 
crude oil stored at the Red Sea port as compensation for unpaid transit fees. In 
return, South Sudan shut down all the oil fields, accusing Sudan of stealing its 
crude (BBC News January 28, 2012). Furthermore, on April 17, 2012, the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and Darfur rebels destroyed oil installations 
in Heglig (BBC News February 22, 2012). The shutdown of the oil fields did not 
significantly affect China’s energy supply, but it greatly impacted the economies 
of the two Sudans, as oil income accounted for 40% of Sudan’s state revenue, and 
98% of South Sudan’s state revenue relied on oil returns (Manson 2012). In order 
Source: BBC News February 22, 2012.
Figure 1. Oil Reserves and Pipelines in Two Sudans
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to prevent another war between the two sides, China was again compelled to 
interfere, urging South Sudan to withdraw its forces from the Heglig area, under 
UNSC resolution 2046. Beijing also invited South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir 
for a visit on April 25, 2012, during which then-President Hu Jintao called for a 
return to talks and an end to conflict between the two countries (Manson and 
Hook 2012). With the efforts of the UNSC and the African Union, plus China’s 
support, on September 27, 2012 in Addis Ababa, Omar al-Bashir and Salva Kiir 
reached an agreement to restart oil exports from South Sudan and to establish 
a demilitarized zone; they also agreed on principles of border demarcation. 
However, right before the revival of oil production on November 27, Sudan raised 
new conditions demanding that South Sudan disarm the SPLA (Hanson 2012). 
This not only further worsened economic conditions in the two Sudans, but also 
showed the limits of the role that can be played by third party mediation.      
In summary, China’s energy diplomacy towards Sudan was driven by its 
special economic and political ties with Khartoum and was facilitated by U.S. 
sanctions on Sudan that allowed Chinese NOCs to operate without much 
competition from international oil majors. Prior to the Darfur crisis, China’s 
foreign policy was largely dominated by its pragmatic economic diplomacy, 
using non-interference as its preferred principle as it did not require China to 
take sides when disputes occurred. Therefore, Beijing kept itself at a distance 
from the Darfur crisis and tried to remain neutral when the two Sudans entered 
into conflict over oil revenues. It showed the necessary flexibility to help solve 
these problems only under the weight of growing international pressure. But the 
Chinese stance in Sudan does not mean that China has fully abandoned the non-
interference principle. As Large has correctly observed, “China has not been so 
politically involved in other ongoing peace initiatives or African conflict zones, 
including in West Africa or the Central African Republic” (Large 2008b, 40). 
Moreover, the failed attempts China made to mediate the dispute between the 
two Sudans might actually have made it less interested in any direct interference 
with the Sudans’ other disputes on its own, but more willing to work with other 
powers, like the United States, to help solve regional conflicts. 
With China’s growing economic potential and its harmonious world 
ambition, the principle of non-interference should be abandoned completely in 
China’s foreign policy framework, thus paving the way for China to demonstrate 
its commitment to become a responsible stakeholder. In order for Beijing to 
further deepen its integration with the world system and to ensure its own 
peaceful development, China will also need to inject some universally accepted 
principles into its harmonious world vision, including the notion of human-
rights.  
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China’s Dealing with the Iran Nuclear Crisis
In contrast to the Sudan case which was underpinned by special political ties from 
the outset, Beijing’s initial dealings with Tehran seemed apolitical and cautious. 
Adopting a passive stance in political affairs in the Middle East throughout the 
1990s, China probably wished to rely on the United States to guarantee order and 
stability in the region (Andrews-Speed, Liao and Dannreuther 2002; Gentry 2005, 
115). The only similarity in the two cases is that in both China pursued pragmatic 
diplomacy to capture all opportunities to gain access to petroleum supplies, 
including the deposits left by other oil majors for political reasons. When it was 
compelled to take sides with regard to the Iranian nuclear program, starting in 
2006, Beijing employed its harmonious world strategy to protect its own interests 
in Iran. To be precise, Beijing has supported some UN endeavours to stop Iran’s 
uranium enrichment to prevent nuclear proliferation but has also helped lessen 
the severity of sanctions against the Iranian regime to protect its energy interests. 
In the end, China has chosen to cooperate with other major powers to be a 
responsible stakeholder in the international community, but its non-cooperation 
with the Western powers when its energy interests are involved has become ever 
more evident. 
As one of the major petroleum producers, at the end of 2011 Iran had 9.1% 
of proven global oil reserves (ranking 4th) and 15.9% of the world’s natural gas 
reserves (second only to Russia’s 21.4%) (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
2012). After China became a net oil importer in 1993, the Middle East was one of 
its key oil supplying regions, and at its peak in 1998, the region was responsible 
for 61% of China’s total oil imports (Tian 1999, 14). In the early days, China’s oil 
imports from Iran remained insignificant, at only 67,900 metric tons (4.3% of 
China’s total) in 1993. But the figure grew more than tenfold by 2000 to 7 million 
tons (mts) (10% of China’s total imports) and was almost quadrupled by 2011, to 
27.76mts (10.9% of the total) (Tian 1995; 2001; 2012). Beijing also signed a series 
of bilateral treaties with Tehran for trade promotion and protection (June 2000) 
and long-term crude trade (March 2002), as well as a framework agreement on 
petroleum cooperation (April 2002) (Yang and Yang 2005, 101). However, the 
disclosure of Iran’s secret nuclear program, in August 2002, led to a dramatic 
deterioration in Tehran’s relationship with the West, and also added complexity to 
the Sino-Iranian relationship. 
On the one hand Beijing showed constant support for the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty aimed at hampering Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
In addition, China voted “yes” in support of a series of UN Security Council 
resolutions demanding that Iran cease uranium enrichment, and imposing 
sanctions on Iran for its refusal to comply with the resolutions. In 1997, under U.S. 
pressure, China also withdrew its nuclear cooperation with Iran, and in January 
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2006 China joined the P5+1 talks with Iran over its nuclear program (Garver 
2011, 75). 
However, in terms of energy business with Iran, China did not stand 
together with its Western counterparts at all times. For instance, in October 2004 
Sinopec signed a $100bn deal with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to 
help develop and exploit Iran’s massive Yadavaran oil field; this happened despite 
a request by the U.S. Embassy in Beijing that China withdraw from the bidding. 
Sinopec instead tried its utmost to pursue its bidding for the exploitation project 
in Iranian oilfields, and subsequently succeeded in reaching an agreement by 
which it would receive 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil over 25 years, and 
would also import 250mts of liquid natural gas (LNG) over the same period 
(People’s Daily February 6, 2004). Earlier, in March 2004, China’s state-owned 
Zhuhai Zhenrong Corporation also signed a $20bn deal with Tehran to import 
110mts of LNG over 25 years (People’s Daily February 6, 2004). 
Explaining the Sinopec position, some Chinese analysts, such as Pan Jiping 
of the Oil and Gas Strategic Research Center under the Ministry of Land and 
Resources, claimed that Washington’s concern over Iran’s nuclear program was 
only an excuse; its real intention was to establish a monopoly over Middle East 
oil. They therefore argued that Beijing should not concede its energy interests 
to serve American objectives. Wang Anjian, Director of the Global Energy and 
Resources Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences, 
also held that “The Americans want to check China and it’s quite normal. Not 
only in the area of energy and resources the same holds true in other areas as 
well, including politics, military, economy and diplomacy. I believe that Chinese 
leaders at the top are surely got prepared for this” (People’s Daily February 6, 
2004). 
By ignoring the U.S. warning over sanctions, the Chinese NOCs also 
benefited from the withdrawal of Western companies, as in the case of Iran’s 
Azadegan oil field. Discovered in 1999, Azadegan is one of the largest oil fields 
in the world, with an estimated oil reserve of 42 billion barrels, according to 
seismographic studies conducted beginning in 2000 by a Japanese consortium 
led by INPEX (BBC Energy Monitory February 2, 2010). In October 2006, the 
INPEX-led consortium was forced to reduce its share by 90% due to heavy 
pressure from the United States. This allowed CNPC to step in with an offer to 
extract 75,000 bpd of oil from wells in North Azadegan. In January 2009, CNPC 
signed a $1.76bn buy-back contract with NIOC to take the lead in developing the 
North Azadegan oil field in two phases: first to increase the oilfield’s production 
capacity to 25,000 bpd within three years, and then to 115,000 bpd within six 
years (Jiang 2005). In 2006 Sinopec agreed to help improve the capacity of Iran’s 
Arak refinery, and in December 2007 concluded a contract for the first phase 
development of the Yadavaran field based on the 2004 MOU (Xinhua December 
10, 2007). Furthermore, at the end of 2006, China’s offshore oil company 
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CNOOC, signed an MOU to develop Iran’s North Pars gas field, with a more 
detailed deal (excluding the price of gas) being reached in November 2008 (Fars 
New November 17, 2008, see Figure 2). These deals made China Iran’s top oil 
purchaser and operator. However, in order to assuage the United States, Beijing 
restricted its activities in Iran to exploration/service contracts and MOUs (Oxford 
Analytica 2010). When Washington intensified its pressure over CNOOC’s 
$16bn contract with Tehran, which was supposed to be signed in February 
2008, CNOOC officials cancelled their visit to Iran at the last minute (Fars New 
November 17, 2008), a gesture to please Washington and also to illustrate that 
Beijing had no intention of challenging U.S. dominance in the Gulf. 
Nevertheless, the past few years have witnessed a more assertive approach 
by China to protect their energy and economic interests in Iran. This was 
probably an attempt to project its harmonious world vision, given the long-
delayed process of settling the nuclear crisis with Iran. In the hope of forcing Iran 
to suspend its nuclear program, Washington restrained its own companies and 
other Western companies from supplying petrol to Tehran in September 2009. 
After facing decades of international sanctions, such a move was deemed to be 
crippling to Iran, as it had insufficient refinery capacity to meet domestic demand 
for petrol  (Telegraph September 23, 2009). Iran then turned to its potential 
allies—China, India, and Venezuela—for help. This time, Chinese NOCs did 
not disappoint Tehran and, beginning in September 2009, provided 30-40,000 
bpd of petrol, equal to a third of Iran’s total petrol imports (Business Monitor 
2009). Earlier, in August, a Chinese consortium signed a $2-3bn deal with Iran to 
develop the capacities of Abadan and Persian Gulf Star refineries, which would 
initially increase refining capacity to 210,000 bpd of crude, and would eventually 
enable a maximum capacity of 360,000 bpd (Tehran Times August 2, 2009). On 
September 9, 2013, China’s Sinopec and a South Korean company (whose name 
was not revealed) reportedly finalized a deal with Iran to invest in a project of 
worth $1.5bn to revamp Iran’s Esfahan Oil Refinery with the aim of boosting the 
refinery’s gasoline and diesel fuel production capacity. Negotiations for launching 
other similar projects at the Abadan Refinery were also ongoing, according to the 
report (Tehran Times September 9, 2013).
On September 24, 2009, a week before the UN Security Council’s meeting 
to discuss a few cases relating to peace and security, including the Iran case, 
Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu reiterated China’s opposition to 
new sanctions against Iran, arguing that “We believe that sanctions and exerting 
pressure are not the way to solve problems and are not conducive for the current 
diplomatic efforts on the Iran nuclear issue” (Jiang 2009). It seemed that the 
ineffective sanctions had diminished Beijing’s enthusiasm for enforcing more UN 
sanctions against Iran, and China was rather more keen to ensure that its energy 
and economic ties with Tehran would not be further undermined. Consistent 
with this view in February 2011, China signed another deal with Iran to invest 
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$2.5bn for developing projects in the South Azadegan oilfield, which had an 
output of 55,000 bpd. The Chinese aimed to enhance the output to 320,000 bpd 
within four years, and then to 600,000 bpd after completion of the entire project 
(Press TV 2011). During an official visit to Iran by a senior Chinese official, He 
Guoqiang, in July 2011, more agreements were signed on infrastructure and trade 
cooperation aimed at strengthening the already strong bilateral political and 
economic ties (Xinhua July 16, 2011). Soon after, Tehran and Beijing entered into 
talks about the introduction of a barter deal to exchange Iranian oil for Chinese 
goods and services, seeing that U.S. financial sanctions had prevented China from 
paying at least $20bn for oil purchases (Bozorgmehr, Fifield, and Hook 2011). 
In view of China’s financial and technological support to major infrastructure 
projects in Iran, John Garver has argued that China will not let concerns over 
Figure 2. Map of Iranian Energy Projects
Source: Davis et al. 2012, 18.
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Iran’s nuclear issue frustrate its strong economic ties with Tehran. He has held that 
Beijing’s support of the U.S.-led international sanctions against Iran was only half-
hearted because it viewed such sanctions as counterproductive and ineffective 
and believed that they would ultimately fail (Garver 2011, 81-2). Leverett and 
Leverett (2011) have also warned that “The United States cannot forever ask 
other countries to act in ways that are harmful to their interests. No country of 
any consequence can sustain such a course indefinitely.” On November 19, 2012, 
in response to a question about the IAEA’s latest report (which said Iran was 
expanding its nuclear capacity by installing more centrifuges at an underground 
enrichment plant), Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying 
insisted that “China has always considered that dialogue and cooperation is the 
only right way to properly resolve the Iranian nuclear issue” (Xinhua October 24, 
2012). Hua also urged all parties concerned to make constructive efforts to seek 
a comprehensive, long-term and appropriate solution at an early date (Xinhua 
October 24, 2012). Despite Beijing’s rhetoric, Garver claims that China’s real 
intent is to offer support to Tehran in the UN Security Council in order to ensure 
access to Iran’s petroleum resources, while also cooperating strategically with the 
Table 1. Major Chinese Investment/Development Projects in Iran’s Energy Sector
Date Field/Project Company or Companies Value in US$
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Sources: Davis et al. 2012, 15; Tehran Times September 9, 2013.
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United States to maintain a favorable macro-climate in relation to other issues 
(Garver 2011, 77).
Indeed, Beijing was not ready to confront Washington over Tehran on 
political grounds. After the U.S. and EU sanctions against Iran went into effect 
in summer 2012, China “appeared to reassess the benefit of its economic 
relationship with Iran” (Keck 2013). Under U.S. legislation, the American 
President was required to sanction countries that refused to reduce their reliance 
on Iranian oil; and any company falling under the sanctions would be denied 
access to the U.S. financial sector (Torbati 2012). In April 2013, CNPC announced 
it was pulling out of the deal to develop part of Iran’s South Pars gas fields, which 
constituted a breach of a $4.7bn contract reached in July 2009, after Total’s 
withdrawal for political concerns. Probably also due to Western pressure, CNPC 
delayed developing the field for a few years despite Iran’s dissatisfaction, and 
ultimately decided to terminate the project (Tehran Times April 23, 2013). Beijing 
has also started to reduce its non-energy related investment in Iran over the past 
couple of years. According to Assadollah Asgaroladi, Director of the Sino-Iranian 
Chamber of Commerce, Chinese non-energy related investment in Iran dropped 
from almost $3bn in 2011 to just $400m in 2012, and their bilateral trade in 2012 
amounted to $37bn, down 18% from $45bn the previous year (Keck 2013). By 
July 2013, China’s import of oil from Iran was further reduced by 12.6% from a 
year earlier, resulting in Iran falling from third place to sixth place as China’s oil 
supplier. To offset its shortfall, China dramatically boosted oil imports from Iraq; 
in July alone, Iraqi oil supplies to China soared 135% from a year before, while 
deliveries by September 2013 rose 47% (Lelyveld 2013). 
After nearly 20 years of direct interaction, China has certainly established 
a stronger presence in Iran and the Middle East in general. Compared with 
the 1990s, Beijing’s reliance on Middle East oil has increased considerably, 
from 11.96mts in 1996, to more than 130mts in 2011 (Su and Tian 1998, 8; 
Tian 2012, 60). Accordingly, China has become more influential in the Persian 
Gulf as well. Therefore, it was quite natural to see a more assertive approach in 
China’s position over the Iran nuclear crisis. By resisting Washington’s efforts to 
obstruct Tehran’s nuclear ambition via sanctions, Beijing could achieve a two-fold 
objective: to pursue its harmonious world blueprint that suggested a multi-valued 
international system, on the one hand, and to allow the Chinese NOCs access to 
Iran’s petroleum resources to help ensure China’s energy security, on the other. 
The question that was left unanswered, though, was what would be China’s value 
system, and what key principles were to be associated with the system? There was 
apparently a lack of explicit principles in China’s harmonious world proposition, 
which made it difficult to predict how China could build a harmonious world 
while also maintaining its position as a responsible global stakeholder. 
For the moment, Beijing has not been able to offer an alternative means 
for dealing effectively with the Iranian nuclear crisis, except for insistence on 
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its bottom line: to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. According 
to Yin Gang from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, although China 
prefers a political settlement of the nuclear issue, Iran should not count on 
China’s unconditional support (Oster 2009). He has held that “If the solution 
to the nuclear issue is through nonpolitical means, or a military attack cannot 
be avoided, I don’t think China has the power to stop such [a] military attack” 
(Oster 2009). China has indeed continued to work with other major powers 
to address the Iran nuclear issue, through IAEA and P5+1 meetings with Iran. 
As of 2013, three rounds of P5+1 meetings have already been held, in Almaty 
(February and April) and Istanbul (March), “as a way to build confidence with 
Iran as the country steadfastly maintains its right to enrich uranium in the face 
of harsh international sanctions” (Blitz and Dyer 2013). The six powers have 
offered some relief on sanctions on Iranian petrochemicals and trade in gold in 
return for a scaling down of Tehran’s nuclear program. However, no agreement 
has been reached as the positions of the two parties remain far apart (Khalaf 
and Bozorgmehr 2013).4 The actions China has recently taken suggest that it is 
willing to sacrifice certain practical interests in exchange for being recognized as 
a responsible stakeholder. The next task for China is to identify common criteria, 
if any, between a responsible stakeholder and the harmonious world vision, or the 
latter will only remain an aspiration.
Conclusion
China’s rise onto the world stage as one of the two largest economic powers, along 
with the United States, has become an undeniable fact. The Chinese government 
is increasingly more confident about its foreign policy options, and it is keen to 
assert China’s positions via peaceful means. As indicated by its energy diplomacy 
towards Sudan and Iran since the 1990s, Beijing has made various efforts to 
showcase their desire to be a responsible stakeholder that is able to peacefully 
emerge as a world power. In its dealings with Sudan, Beijing has moved away 
from its non-interference principle to illustrate its responsible power status and 
has played a positive role in helping solve the Darfur crisis and in mediating 
the conflict between the two Sudans despite not always with success. China’s 
position towards Iran has demonstrated its ambition to play a greater role in the 
international rule-making process, while protecting its economic and energy 
interests by withholding full cooperation with the Western powers. Nevertheless, 
due to the lack of well-defined principles and guidelines to operationalize its 
harmonious world vision, China has not been able to provide an alternative 
option to help solve the Iran nuclear crisis. As a result, it has had to choose either 
to cooperate with Iran in order to ensure its energy supply and face the associated 
foreign criticism or to sacrifice its interests in Iran under Western pressure in 
218 Janet Xuanli Liao
order to maintain its reputation as a responsible stakeholder. 
In both cases, China has shown that it is not attempting to challenge the 
hegemony of the United States and other major powers; nor has it tried to alter its 
peaceful development strategy. This stance lends credibility to China’s professed 
benign intentions. Yet China’s energy diplomacy has not consistently facilitated 
its ambition for peaceful development due to two main problems. One problem is 
that China has not given up the non-interference principle completely, probably 
in order to retain its competitive advantage in Africa and/or in other developing 
regions. But if China means to be more proactive and responsible in international 
affairs, abandoning the non-interference principle would be an essential and 
unavoidable step on the path. The other problem is that China must ensure that 
its harmonious world vision is compatible with certain universally accepted 
principles in today’s world. Energy diplomacy could be used as a means for 
Beijing to help establish new principles for its foreign policy, but this has not yet 
been accomplished. Until then, there could be little chance for China to emerge 
peacefully as a truly global power.
China has started the journey towards being a responsible stakeholder 
and constructing a harmonious world but has yet to convince the world that its 
harmonious world ambition would be compatible with the current international 
order. Chinese scholars assert that China is willing to be a responsible 
stakeholder, and thus should be allowed to play a greater role in the international 
system, but they remain at variance over how to pursue the harmonious world 
aspiration. If it is by supporting the U.S. hegemonic status, there is no need to 
raise such a desire in the first place; but if it is by projecting its own value system 
onto the international order, Beijing ought to clarify such a system and also test 
its acceptability within the international establishment (Wang 2006; Zheng 2012). 
Of course, other established powers also need to embrace a rising China and be 
prepared to work with the emerging power on issues related to world peace and 
energy security. China should be allowed and welcomed to play a greater role in 
international affairs and be given more time to find a balance between its own 
interests and those of other nations. 
Notes
The author is very grateful to Professor Melaku Destas and Mr Leonardus Gerber for their 
valuable advice and assistance, which has helped enrich the article considerably. The author 
also wishes to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments, which has 
further facilitated the improvement of the article.  
1. The five principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual 
non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual 
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benefit; and peaceful coexistence. They were proposed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 
1953 while meeting an Indian delegation, and were included in the Communiqué of the 
Bandung Asian-African Conference in April 1955.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent dollar figures indicate U.S. dollars.
3. This statement was somewhat of an exaggeration: the highest figures of Sudan’s share 
of China’s oil imports were 8.3% (in 2001) and 9.3% (in 2002), and declined thereafter to 
5.4% in average between 2002-2012 (Tian, in various years).
4. Hasan Rouhani was elected Iran’s new President in June 2013 and assumed office 
on August 3. In his statement at the United Nation’s General Assembly, on September 24, 
President Rouhani promised to resolve the nuclear issue in the next 12 months, triggering 
a lot of hope of resolving the long lasting crisis. However, according to a BBC report 
on October 9, someone who was present during an informal exchange following the 
President’s on-the-record remarks said: “The impression we got was that President Rouhani 
would regard the giving up of even one of their 18,000 [uranium enrichment] centrifuges 
as an unbearable blow to national pride.” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohamed Javad Zarif 
also allegedly said, on the record, that Iran regarded its right to enrich nuclear fuel as “non-
negotiable” (Urban 2013). Therefore, it seems still too early to expect a quick solution for 
the Iranian nuclear problem even with the change of leadership.
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